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THE CHEVRON LEGACY: YOUNG v. COMMUNITY
NUTRITION INSTITUTE COMPOUNDS
THE CONFUSION
Courts have applied varying standards when reviewing ques-
tions of law decided by administrative agencies.' The Supreme
Court, in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,2 at-
tempted to establish the proper standard.3 The Court's subsequent
applications of the Chevron standard, however, have produced di-
verse results. Most recently, in Young v. Community Nutrition Institute,4
the Court departed from Chevron and from the existing scope-of-
review doctrine that forms the basis of Chevron.
Post-Chevron decisions demonstrate the dangers of according
too much weight to Chevron's deferential tone rather than respecting
its underlying doctrine. Properly interpreted, Chevron conforms to
traditional scope-of-review doctrine. This doctrine allows courts to
defer to an agency's decision unless the intent of the agency's en-
abling statute dictates otherwise. Some post-Chevron cases consist-
ently apply this doctrine; in Young, however, the Court went beyond
Chevron to create a standard of greater deference.
This Note will attempt to shed light on the continuing confu-
sion surrounding scope of review of administrative questions of law.
It will trace the evolution of this doctrine, examining the traditional
review framework. Then it will discuss the Chevron opinion, sug-
gesting that the decision is consistent with pre-Chevron cases. Fi-
nally, the Note will look at post-Chevron cases, focusing particularly
on the Young decision's departure from traditional review doctrine.
I
REVIEW BEFORE CHEVRON
A. Questions of Law Defined
Questions of law arise in administrative settings when an
agency attempts to construe its statutory mandate.5 In promulgat-
1 See, e.g., Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir.
1976) (recognizing two irreconcilable approaches); see also 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE §§ 29:9-29:10 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing inconsistencies in the doctrine).
2 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
3 Id. at 842-43.
4 106 S. Ct. 2360 (1986).
5 Professor Davis has explained the problem as one of applying the law to a given
set of facts. See 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, § 29.9. Although accurate, this characterization
may not frame the question properly because questions of law in the administrative con-
text mainly address whether an agency correctly determined the scope of its own pow-
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ing rules or enforcing regulations, an agency often interprets partic-
ular terms or phrases in its enabling statute.6 Decisions of law thus
define the scope of an agency's power. 7 Courts will invalidate
agency decisions of law if the agency interpreted its scope of author-
ity incorrectly8 or in a statutorily impermissible manner.9
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)'O normally governs
judicial review of administrative decisions. The APA mandates de
novo review of questions of law."1 Actual review, however, often
ers. 2 C. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 9.18 (1985); R. PIERCE, S.
SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 5.1.1 (1985) [hereinafter R.
PIERCE].
Courts in the administrative context have difficulty categorizing issues into ques-
tions of either law or fact. Professor Jaffe analyzed the distinction, L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 548-55 (1965), and abandoned the "unanchored
abstractness of distinguishing between fact and law simpliciter," id. at 548 (emphasis in
original), instead asking the more subtle question, "how do we distinguish a finding offact
from a conclusion of law?" Id. (emphasis in original). He defined a finding of fact as "the
assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or will be happening independent of or
anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect." Id. (emphasis deleted). Mixed questions
of fact and law add to the complexity of this analysis.
One commentator explained the law, fact, and mixed questions of law and fact cate-
gories as follows:
Thus, we should speak of fact finding, which obviously is mainly for
the administrator; law declaring, which has to do with general construc-
tion of a statute wholly independently of the particular controversy at
bar, which will be mainly, and very often entirely, for our best experts at
such matters as statutory construction ... ; and the last function, spoken
of in the familiar but muddling way as 'mixed question,' is what I call law
applying, or applying a statutory or other item of law to the particular
facts at bar, a function which in the normal course is mainly for the
agency because in the normal course, the decisions will have little bearing
on any other decision.
Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action-Remarks Before the D.C. Circuit Judicial
Conference, 34 FED. B.J. 54, 58 (1975), reprinted in W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAUSS, T.
RAKOFF & R. SCHOTLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 380 (8th ed. 1987) [hereinafter W.
GELLHORN].
6 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (determining whether the statutory term "stationary source" permitted a plant-
wide definition); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944) (deciding whether
newsboys were covered by the statutory term "employees").
7 See C. KOCH, supra note 5, § 9.18; R. PIERCE, supra note 5, § 5.1.1.
8 See supra note 7.
9 For example, in Chevron the challengers argued that both the words and history
of the statute constrained the agency's interpretation of "stationary source." See infra
notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
10 5 U.S.C. §9 551-706 (1982). An agency's enabling statute may, however, pro-
vide otherwise. R. PIERCE, supra note 5, § 5.3.
11 Under the APA, "[t]he reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law .. " 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). The APA provides for a "substantial evidence" stan-
dard of review for questions of fact, id. § 706(2)(E), and an "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review for legislative-like policy questions. Id. § 706(2)(A). To be consis-
tent with review of fact and policy one would expect questions of law to receive de novo
review. See generally C. KOCH, supra note 5, § 9.18.
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falls short of conventional de novo review. 12
Many commentators have noted that prior to Chevron court re-
view of agency decisions of law fell into one of two fundamentally
irreconcilable lines of cases: a conventional de novo review ap-
proach or a more deferential "reasonableness" approach. 13 Thus,
courts could either independently decide a question of law or defer
to the agency decision. 14
B. The Two Lines of Cases of the Pre-Chevron Era
NLRB v. Hearst Publications 15 demonstrates the line of cases sup-
porting judicial deference to agency decisions of law. t 6 Hearst ad-
dressed whether newsboys were "employees" within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).17 In Hearst the newspa-
pers had refused to bargain collectively with newsboys who sought
12 C. KOCH, supra note 5, at 132. Conventional de novo review means review in the
appellate court paradigm. Because a question of law in the administrative context in-
volves statutory interpretation within the unique dynamics of the legisla-
tive/administrative relationship, the federal court paradigm does not provide an apt
analogy. The inquiry is not, strictly speaking, whether the agency got it right, but
whether the agency had the power to decide the question at all, and, if so, whether the
agency decided within the proper bounds of its authority. This is de novo review in the
sense that a court is still the ultimate arbiter of the statutory question, but the inquiry
ends if the agency properly had the discretion to decide. See infra notes 29-33 and ac-
companying text.
13 5 K. DAvIs, supra note 5, § 29:11; Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative
State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1985); StarrJudicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 283, 292-93 (1986); Note, A Framework for Judicial Review of an Agency's
Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1985
DUKE L.J. 469, 471 (authored by Stephen M. Lynch). Commentators found great diffi-
culty reconciling these two lines of cases, ultimately deciding that a court had the discre-
tion to choose one method of review or the other. Noting this apparent anomaly,Judge
Friendly stated: "We think it is time to recognize... that there are two lines of Supreme
Court decisions on this subject which are analytically in conflict, with the result that a
court of appeals must choose the one it deems more appropriate for the case at hand."
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976).
14 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 5, § 29:11; G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 157 (3d ed. 1986); see also Pittston Stevedoring Corp., 544 F.2d at
49.
15 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
16 See also Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941). In Gray, the receivers of a railroad
challenged the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-48, 50 Stat. 72 (1937),
arguing that the railroad met an exception to the Act's price restrictions for parties who
were both producers and consumers; the receivers challenged the agency finding that it
was not a producer under the Act. Deferring to the agency's decision, the Court stated:
"Unless we can say that a set of circumstances deemed by the Commission to bring them
within the concept 'producer' is so unrelated to the tasks entrusted by Congress to the
Commission as in effect to deny a sensible exercise ofjudgment, it is the Court's duty to
leave the Commission's judgment undisturbed." Id. at 413; see also Rochester Tele-
phone Corp. v. FCC, 307 U.S. 125 (1939) (allowing the agency to determine whether
one phone company "controlled" another within the meaning of the statute).
17 322 U.S. at 117; see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
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the protection of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).18
The NLRB determined that newsboys were "employees" and thus
enforced their right to bargain collectively.1 9
In upholding the NLRB's determination, the Court apparently
adopted a deferential standard of review for questions of law. 20 The
Court stated that "the Board's determination that specified persons
are 'employees' under [the] Act is to be accepted if it has 'warrant in
the record' and a reasonable basis in law." 2 1 Hearst has become a
symbol for judicial deference to agency decisions. 22
Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB 23 exemplifies the second line of
cases. 24 In Packard the NLRB determined that foremen were em-
ployees under the NLRA.25 The Court upheld the Board's decision,
but apparently decided the issue de novo. 26 Reviewing the statute
at issue, the Court attempted to determine Congressional intent
from the language and purposes of the provision.27
Both Hearst and Packard reviewed the NLRB's construction of
the term "employee." The Hearst Court deferred to the Board's
construction while the Packard Court construed the term independ-
ent of any consideration of the Board's construction. Although
these two approaches appear contradictory, the Packard Court made
no attempt to reconcile the results. 28
C. Reconciling the Irreconcilable
A closer analysis of the pre-Chevron cases establishes some or-
der among these apparently diverse results. A framework exists
which reconciles the Hearst rationality cases with the Packard de novo
review cases. The common thread running through these cases is
the judicial search for congressionally imposed bounds.
18 332 U.S. at 112.
19 Id. at 114.
20 Id. at 130-32.
21 Id. at 131.
22 Levin, Federal Scope-of-Review Standards: A Preliminary Restatement, 37 ADMIN. L.
REv. 95, 105 (1985).
23 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
24 See also Office Employees Int'l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957). Office Em-
ployees addressed whether labor unions that hired clerical personnel were employers
under section 2(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982). The Board had exempted
the union/employer from the requirements of the Act. The Court independently con-
strued the statute, reversing the Board.
25 330 U.S. at 488-89 (interpreting section 2(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)
(1982)).
26 The Court called the issue a "naked question of law." Id. at 493.
27 Id. at 488-91.
28 The majority in Packard failed to mention Hearst. The dissent cited Hearst for the
proposition that "'employee' must be considered in the context of the Act." Id. at 495
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Throughout the pre-Chevron decisions, courts struggled with
their responsibility "to determine what statutory authority ha[d]
been conferred upon the administrative agency." 29 Courts have the
primary responsibility for determining the proper scope of agency
authority, 30 which is really a search for parameters.3 ' Courts define
those parameters by examining the agency's enabling act. Courts
must decide what authority Congress delegated to the agency to de-
termine whether the agency exceeded its congressional mandate.32
Although the statutory language may provide some guidance,
courts must look beyond the mere text of the enabling statute to
make this determination. 33 Courts must look to all reasonable
sources to discover Congress's intent, including the statute's legisla-
tive history and its supporting policies.
Under this approach, the two "inconsistent" lines of pre-
Chevron cases simply represent cases decided at different levels of
inquiry.3 4 For instance, Hearst contains language suggesting a ra-
tional basis approach, 35 but this language came after the Court in-
29 Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 27 (1983).
30 Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1, 20-21
(1985); see also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390
U.S. 261, 272 (1968) ("courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction
and 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative
decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the con-
gressional policy underlying a statute' ") (citation omitted) (quoting NLRB v. Brown,
380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965)).
31 See Levin, supra note 30, at 21-22; Monaghan, supra note 29, at 27.
32 Monaghan, supra note 29, at 27; see Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 237 (1974)
("In order for an agency interpretation to be granted deference, it must be consistent
with the congressional purpose.").
33 See, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S.
116, 129 (1985) (legislative history and goals of the statute); Volkswagenwerk, 390 U.S. at
272 (court must look to policy behind statute); see also R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 311-51
(1986) (statutory interpretation involves analysis of legislative intent, speaker's meaning,
legislator's political convictions, and legislative history); Levin, supra note 30, at 41 (leg-
islative history and general statutory purposes).
34 Levin, supra note 30, at 23-25; Monaghan, supra note 29, at 30. A number of
other pre-Ghevron cases can be reconciled within this framework. For example, Gray v.
Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941), and Office Employee Int'l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313
(1957), both fit within the framework. Although courts frequently cite Gray for defer-
ence, the Court actually employed the traditional analysis of congressional intent. In
upholding the agency, the Court noted first that Congress had consciously omitted a
more detailed definition of the producer/consumer exception. 314 U.S. at 410-11. The
Court stated, "Congress, which could have legislated specifically as to the individual
exemptions from the code, found it more efficient to delegate that function ...." Id. at
411-12. Office Employees was a case of clear congressional intent. The Court examined
section 2(2) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982), and found that the NLRB's deci-
sion contravened the plain language of the Act. 353 U.S. at 316; see also F.E.C. v. Demo-
cratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27 (1981); NLRB v. Hendricks County
Elec. Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981).
35 322 U.S. at 131 ("the Board's determination... is to be accepted if it has 'war-
rant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law").
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quired into the proper parameters for the agency decision.3 6 The
major portion of the Hearst opinion analyzed whether the statute
mandated either a state law37 or a general common law38 approach
to the definition of "employee." The Court deferred to the agency's
definition only after finding no clear statutory intent,3 9 effectively
holding that Congress implicitly left the question to the agency.
Packard similarly fits into this approach. In Packard the statute
defined both "employer" and "employee." 40 Thus, the issue dif-
fered from that in Hearst because Congress's intent was clear. The
Court simply interpreted the statute and decided that the foremen
more appropriately fit into the definition of employee.41 Packard
represents a case in which the statute specifically bound agency ac-
tion. The Court's "only function [was] to determine whether the
order of the Board [was] authorized by the statute." 42
II
THE CHEVRON DECISION
Many commentators have hailed Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council43 as a landmark decision.44 Restrained to its
facts, however, Chevron is consistent with prior case law.45 The Chev-
ron Court deferred to the agency because of the Court's interpreta-
tion of the statute rather than any new standard of review. Thus,
properly viewed, Chevron is simply one of many in a long line of
cases.
46
A. The Facts
Chevron involved the EPA's interpretation of "stationary
source," a phrase in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.47
36 Id. at 129 ("the broad language of the Act's definitions ... leaves no doubt that
its applicability is to be determined broadly").
37 Id. at 122-24.
38 Id. at 120-22.
39 Thus, one may view Hearst as a paradigm example of the framework set forth
above. Levin, supra note 30, at 23-25; Monaghan, supra note 29, at 28-30.
40 Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act defined "employee" while sec-
tion 2(2) defined "employer." The Court compared the two competing definitions. 330
U.S. at 488-89; see 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
41 330 U.S. at 488 ("The point that these foremen are employees both in the most
technical sense at common law as well as in common acceptance of the term, is too
obvious to be labored.")
42 Id.
43 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
44 See, e.g., Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEx. L. REV. 207,
224-25 (1984); Starr, supra note 13, at 283-84; Note, supra note 13, at 470.
45 See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
46 See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
47 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982).
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The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to impose emission standards
on each "stationary source." 48 Consequently, the interpretation of
"stationary source" is critical for regulating emissions.
The EPA defined stationary source according to the "bubble"
concept,49 treating each polluter as a single source rather than regu-
lating each individual smokestack. Under this definition, polluters
can shift emissions among smokestacks to meet EPA guidelines, and
the EPA has limited control over individual smokestack pollution. 50
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) challenged
the EPA's definition, arguing that the statute constrained the defini-
tion of stationary source to a "building, structure, facility, or instal-
lation." 51 The NRDC further argued that the statute's legislative
history and policies supported the more narrow smokestack defini-
tion.52 The D.C. Circuit found no express guidance from those
sources, but invalidated the agency's ruling on general policy
grounds. 53 The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the EPA's
construction.54
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens enunciated a
two-step framework for reviewing agency decisions of law.55 The
first step requires courts to look at congressional intent. If congres-
sional intent is clear, courts and agencies must comply.56 If intent is
not clear, then the second step allows courts to defer to a reasonable
48 Id.
49 467 U.S. at 857-58.
50 Before adopting the "bubble" concept, the EPA had used a dual definition, ap-
plying a more stringent "definition of 'source' for nonattainment areas that required a
permit whenever a change in either the entire plant, or one of its components, would
result in a significant increase in emissions even if the increase was completely offset by
reductions elsewhere in the plant." Id. at 857.
The EPA universally adopted the "bubble" definition because of the disadvantages
of this dual system. The Court summarized the agency's reasons as follows:
[The EPA] pointed out that the dual definition 'can act as a disincentive
to new investment and modernization by discouraging modifications to
existing facilities' and 'can actually retard progress in air pollution con-
trol by discouraging replacement of older, dirtier processes or pieces of
equipment with new, cleaner ones.'
Id. at 858 (quoting Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Plans;
Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280, 16,281 (pro-
posed Mar. 12, 1981)).
51 Id. at 860. Although this langauge came from a different section of the Act,
§ I1 (a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3), and was itself ambiguous, the NRDC argued that it
indicated congressional intent.
52 467 U.S. at 862, 864.
53 Natural Resources Defense Council v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub. nom. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
54 467 U.S. at 866.
55 Id. at 842-43.
56 Id.
1987]
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agency construction. 57
B. Greater Deference?
Many commentators view Chevron as the beginning of greater
judicial deference towards agency determinations. 58 They suggest
that the first step of Chevron entails a very narrow analysis of con-
gressional intent: If Congress has not explicitly spoken on the pre-
cise issue at hand, courts must defer.59
The Chevron framework alone, however, sheds little light upon
the nature of the inquiry into congressional intent. The amount of
deference accorded an agency *depends on where the courts search
for congressional intent. This is the crux of the inquiry. Chevron
supports heightened judicial deference only if Chevron restrains the
search for congressional intent. However, Chevron and the doctrine
on which it is based do not support such an approach.
Some language in Chevron does suggest a deferential approach.
The opinion could be read as mandating heightened deference by
deferring to the agency when Congress has not "directly addressed
the precise question at issue." 60 Under this view, courts would up-
hold agency judgments unless clear congressional language existed
to the contrary. 6' This approach prevents courts from using their
full arsenal of interpretive tools in assessing congressional intent.
The word "precise" could indeed connote a narrow judicial
search for intent. The Court's actual use of the standard, however,
belies that connotation. The fundamental inquiry is this: Where did
the Court look to determine if Congress had addressed the issue?62
At this level, Chevron differs little from Hearst.
The Chevron Court examined congressional intent by analyzing
(1) the statutory language;63 (2) the legislative history;64 and (3) the
57 Id. at 843.
58 See supra note 44, see also Starr, supra note 13, at 294, 295 (Chevron "strengthened
the deference principle by restricting the power of federal courts to reject an agency
interpretation on the grounds of infidelity to the policies underlying the statute." Starr
acknowledged, however, that policy questions must enter into the Court's analysis of
congressional intent.).
59 The operative words here are "explicitly" and "precise." Congress often pro-
vides broad guidelines for precise issues. However, deference depends on whether a
court will demand explicit congressional guidance; one view of Chevron is that it supports
deference whenever the statute is not very explicit. See id. at 292.
60 467 U.S. at 843.
61 See Starr, supra note 13, at 294-95 (arguing for a restricted analysis of congres-
sional intent).
62 The range of sources to which a court may look is potentially quite large. See
generally R. DWORKIN, supra note 33, at 311-51 (1986) (discussing statutory
interpretation).
63 467 U.S. at 859-62.
64 Id. at 862-64.
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policies behind the statute.65 The opinion fully discusses the incon-
sistent legislative history66 and underlying policy conflicts. 67 The
Court found two distinct and irreconcilable policy goals, one envi-
ronmental and the other economic. 68
After reviewing these sources, the Court felt compelled to ac-
cept the agency's interpretation because the sources did not provide
any clear guidelines. 69 Thus, Chevron does not advance a more def-
erential standard of review, but simply represents a case which, on
its facts, required judicial deference. The nature of Chevron's search
for guidance tempers its deferential language concerning congres-
sional intent.
This analysis does not suggest that the Court correctly resolved
the statutory interpretation question. Ample support existed for the
challengers' view. A court necessarily has some discretion in mat-
ters of statutory interpretation. A court must justify its decision,
however, by looking to the statute. Reaching an arguably wrong de-
cision on the statutory question is very different from adopting a
different standard of review. In Chevron, the Court may have done
the former, but did not do the latter.
Chevron expressly endorses the existing scope-of-review frame-
work. 70 Justice Stevens's analysis in Chevron parallels the search for
parameters evident in the pre-Chevron cases. 7' By stating that the
Court's analysis must begin with a determination of congressional
boundaries, 72 Justice Stevens apparently intended the opinion in
Chevron to be consistent with traditional judicial review doctrine.73
65 Id. at 864-66. At the end of its opinion, the Court addressed the policy question
with deferential language. However, earlier in the opinion, the Court carefully examined
competing policy goals exemplified in the statute. Id. at 851-53.
66 Id. at 862-64.
67 Id. at 864-66.
68 Id. at 851-52, 865-66. The Court carefully considered but failed to resolve these
competing goals. This is contrary to Judge Starr's conception of the decision, see Starr,
supra note 13, at 291-300, and indicates compliance with existing scope-of-review prac-
tice. While the Court disavowed any expertise in resolving policy conflicts, 467 U.S. at
865, it did not advocate ignoring clear expressions of congressional intent. Specifically,
the Court stated that the agency's role was restricted to "resolving the competing inter-
ests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency." Id. at 865-66.
69 The Court found that deference was necessary because of the lack of congres-
sional guidance on what was fundamentally a policy question. 467 U.S. at 864-66. This
does not mean, however, that the Court was unwilling to consider all sources of congres-
sional intent. Indeed, the Court's extensive discussion and analysis indicates otherwise.
70 Id. at 842-45.
71 See supra sections I(B) and I(C).
72 "First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the pre-
cise question at issue." 467 U.S. at 842.
73 Indeed, Justice Stevens cited a number of cases which implicitly contained the
Chevron framework. See, e.g., F.E.C. v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454
U.S. 27, 32 (1981) ("[C]ourts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction.
1987]
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Although the particular facts of Chevron led to a deferential opinion,
Chevron does not necessarily endorse greater deference.74
III
POST-CHEVRON CASES
Post-Chevron decisions fall into two groups. The first fits neatly
into the traditional framework and therefore is consistent with Chev-
ron.75 The second, represented by Young v. Community Nutrition Insti-
They must reject administrative constructions of the statute ... that are inconsistent
with the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress sought to imple-
ment."); S.E.C. v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 119 (1978) ("our clear duty in [cases where the
agency construction is inconsistent with the statutory mandate] is to reject the adminis-
trative interpretation of the statute"); NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130-
31 (1944) ("questions of statutory interpretation... are for the courts to resolve").
74 For example, if congressional intent had more clearly favored clean-up, the
agency could not have adopted the plant-wide "bubble" definition. In Chevron, congres-
sional intent was unfathomable even after a careful search. Most importantly, Chevron's
deference came only after this careful search.
75 In addition to Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470
U.S. 116 (1985), a number of other post-Chevron opinions demonstrate the consistency
of the doctrine. For example, in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987),Justice
Stevens's majority opinion rejected an INS policy applying similar standards for grant-
ing asylum and withholding deportation. Id. at 1210. Citing Chevron, Stevens asserted
that when a court confronts a question of statutory interpretation, it must use all the
"traditional [interpretive] tools" to resolve the ambiguity. Id. at 1221. Cardoza-Fonseca
demonstrates clearly that the Chevron framework is consistent with the traditional ap-
proach.
See also United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657 (1986), a case involving in-
terim rates set for the sale of federally-generated hydroelectric power. Federal law pro-
vided that rates became effective upon approval by the Secretary of Energy. The
regional power administration set interim rates effective until final approval by the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission. The city contended that these interim rates vio-
lated the Commission's enabling act. The Court relied expressly on Chevron in
upholding the agency's interpretation allowing interim rates. Id. at 666. The Court
looked to statutory language, congressional intent, and the policy behind the statute to
determine the constraints on agency action before deferring to the agency's decision.
In Board of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986), the Court
overruled agency action as violating clear congressional intent in a classic application of
the first tier of the review framework. The Federal Reserve Board had expanded its
regulations to encompass institutions which offered bank-like services. In so doing, the
Board re-interpreted the definition of "bank" found in section 2(c) of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). The Court ruled that the statutory
definition of "bank" clearly precluded the Board's action. 474 U.S. at 368. Failure to
regulate these institutions, the Board urged, would leave a gap in regulation. Id. at 373-
74. The Court, however, found itself constrained by the Act's language, stating, "If the
Bank Holding Company [Act] falls short of providing safeguards desirable or necessary
to protect the public interest, that is a problem for Congress, and not the Board or the
courts, to address." Id. at 374. See generally Note, supra note 13, at 481-87 (discussing
Securities Indus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984) and Securities In-
dus. Ass'n. v. Board of Governors, 468 U.S. 207 (1984)).
The standard of review in these cases, if not its application, remained consistent
with traditional doctrine. The Court was willing to look below the statutory surface to
divine congressional intent. A departure from that willingness would be more radical
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tute,7 6 radically departs from this doctrine. Young unjustifiably
expands judicial deference beyond the Chevron framework.
A. Cases Within the Traditional Framework
Most post-Chevron cases adhere to the traditional question-of-
law doctrine. Chemical Manufacturers Association v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,77 for example, indicates that post-Chevron review
should not differ markedly from pre-Chevron review. Both the ma-
jority and the dissent in Chemical Manufacturers invoked Chevron and
approached the problem according to the traditional framework es-
tablished in Hearst.
In Chemical Manufacturers the Court interpreted section 301 (1) of
the Clean Water Act,78 which stated: "The Administrator may not
modify any requirement of this section as it applies to any specific
pollutant which is on the toxic pollutant list under section
1317(a)(1) of this title."'79
Prior to the enactment of this section in 1977, the EPA granted
variances from toxic pollutant effluent limitations promulgated
under the Clean Water Act based upon proof of "fundamentally dif-
ferent factors" (FDF) unique to an individual case.80 FDF variances
allowed the EPA to tailor its regulations to individual polluters upon
demonstration of "factors fundamentally different from those con-
sidered by EPA" in promulgating its effluent regulations.8 1 The is-
sue in the case was whether section 301(l) prohibited these
variances.8 2
The NRDC advocated a broad reading of the term "modify" in
section 301(l), arguing that FDF variances were modifications that
the statute expressly barred.8 3 The EPA advocated a more re-
stricted reading, "insist[ing] that § 301 (1) prohibits only those modi-
fications expressly permitted by other provisions of § 301, namely,
those that § 301(c) and § 301(g) would allow on economic or water-
than any individual deferential result. The Young case represents such a departure. See
infra section III(B).
76 106 S. Ct. 2360 (1986).
77 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
78 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1982).
79 Id.
80 470 U.S. at 120-22.
81 Id. at 121-22. The EPA promulgated extensive criteria for evaluating the neces-
sity of an FDF variance. Theoretically, such a variance could either weaken or
strengthen the existing regulations. Id. at 120-22 n.7.
82 Id. at 124-25.
83 Id. at 125 ("NRDC insists that the language of § 301(1) is itself enough to [pre-
empt the agency action], since on its face it forbids any modifications of the effluent
limitations that EPA must promulgate for toxic pollutants. If the word 'modify' in
§ 301(1) is read in its broadest sense, that is, to encompass any change or alteration in
the standards, NRDC is correct.").
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quality grounds."8 4
Invoking Chevron, the Court exhaustively analyzed the statute,
its legislative history, and its supporting policies.8 5 The Court
found that "neither the language nor the legislative history of the
Act demonstrate[d] a clear Congressional intent to forbid EPA's
sensible variance mechanism." 86 Consequently, the Court deferred
to the agency's determination that "§ 301() does not prohibit FDF
variances."87
Justice Marshall's dissent 8 argued that congressional intent
was clear. Marshall applied the Chevron framework, 9 but found
clear congressional intent under the first prong of the Chevron test.
He found that Congress intended section 301(l) to prohibit FDF
variances: 90
The plain meaning of § 301(), the changes made prior to enact-
ment of the bill containing this provision, and the clearly ex-
pressed congressional objectives in enacting § 301()-to deal
vigorously and comprehensively with the extremely serious envi-
ronmental problem caused by toxic pollutants-establish that this
provision's scope was meant to be considerably broader than that
attributed to it by EPA.9'
In determining congressional intent, Marshall analyzed the "lan-
guage, history, structure, and purpose" of the statute.92
Two possible explanations exist for the split in the Court. First,
the majority may have applied Chevron more deferentially than the
dissent. If so, this would support the view that Chevron began a new,
more deferential era. One reason to reject this explanation is that
Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron,joined in Marshall's dissent. A
plausible conclusion is that Stevens found the dissent more consis-
tent with his view of Chevron. A more compelling reason for re-
jecting this explanation is that both the majority and the dissent
84 Id.
85 Id. at 126-33.
86 Id. at 134.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 134-65 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined in
the full dissent while justice O'Connor joined parts I, II, and III. Id. at 165 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 152 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("My disagreement with the Court does not
center on its reading of Chevron, but instead on its analysis of the congressional purposes
behind § 301 (1). If I agreed with the Court's analysis of the statute and the legislative
history, I too would conclude that Chevron commands deference to the administrative
construction.").
90 Id. at 165.
91 Id. at 137.
92 Id. at 135.
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considered the same factors in reaching their results. 93
Second, the Court may have applied the Chevron framework
consistently with past review doctrine but individual applications
may have produced different results. Both the majority and the dis-
sent applied a standard similar if not identical to the traditional
scope-of-review standard.94 In all cases under Chevron, courts must
look at specific factors95 to determine congressional intent. Various
judges may or may not find guidance in those factors, but the
method remains constant.96
B. The Young Case
1. The Opinion
Young v. Community Nutrition Institute97 involved the Food and
Drug Administration's (FDA) decision not to promulgate a toler-
ance level for the carcinogen aflatoxin in feed corn. 98 Challengers
to this decision argued that because aflatoxin was an unavoidable
added contaminant of food, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA)99 required the FDA to establish such a tolerance
level.' 00 Their argument was based on section 346 of the FDCA:
Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food,
except where such substance is required in the production thereof
or cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice shall be
deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause
(2)(a) of section 342(a) of this title; but when such substance is so
required or cannot be so avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate
regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds
necessary for the protection of public health, and any quantity ex-
ceeding the limits so fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe for
purposes of the application of clause (2)(A) of section 342(a) of
this title.' 01
The FDA argued that the phrase "to such extent as he finds
necessary for the protection of public health"10 2 modified the word
"shall," allowing the FDA discretion in promulgating tolerance
93 Both the majority and the dissent relied on the words, legislative history, and
goals of the statute. Id. at 129, 135.
94 See supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text.
95 Those factors include statutory language, legislative history, and the statute's un-
derlying policies. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
859-66 (1984).
96 See supra note 75.
97 106 S. Ct. 2360 (1986).
98 Id. at 2363.
99 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1982).
100 106 S. Ct. at 2364.
101 21 U.S.C. § 346 (1982) (emphasis added).
102 106 S. Ct. at 2364.
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levels. The challengers argued that the phrase modified "the quan-
tity therein or thereon," leaving "shall" unqualified. 0 3 Under this
view, the statute required the FDA to set tolerance levels for any
"added" substance that is "harmful" and "unavoidable."' 10 4
The D.C. Circuit ruled against the agency, holding that the stat-
ute precluded the agency's interpretation. 10 5 The Supreme Court
reversed and upheld the agency interpretation, basing its decision
on the Chevron doctrine.
Applying the first level of the Chevron inquiry, the Young Court
found the statute ambiguous because "the phrasing of § 346 admits
of either respondents' or petitioner's reading."' 1 6 The statute's fa-
cial ambiguity justified deference to the agency interpretation. 10 7
Consequently, the Court held that Chevron compelled judicial defer-
ence and upheld the agency's interpretation.
The Court focused on the ambiguous wording of section 346 in
finding an ambiguity that necessitated deference.' 08 The Court only
superficially attempted to resolve that ambiguity.' 0 9 Chevron, how-
ever, requires a deeper analysis. The search for congressional intent
must center not only on the specific statutory language, but on the
statute as a whole." 0 Normal modes of discerning congressional
intent require courts to extend the search beyond the statutory lan-
guage alone."' The Young Court failed to undertake or even to rec-
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 757 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S.
Ct. 2360 (1986).
i06 106 S. Ct. at 2364.
107 Id. at 2364-65.
[W]hile we agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress in § 346 was
speaking directly to the precise question at issue in this case, we cannot
agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress unambiguously expressed
its intent through its choice of statutory language .... As enemies of the
dangling participle well know, the English language does not always force
a writer to specify which of two possible objects is the one to which a
modifying phrase relates. A Congress more precise or more prescient
than the one that enacted § 346 might, if it wished petitioner's position to
prevail, have placed "to such extent as he finds necessary for the protec-
tion of public health" as an appositive phrase immediately after "shall"
rather than as a free-floating phrase after "the quantity therein or
thereon." A Congress equally fastidious and foresighted, but intending
respondents' position to prevail, might have substituted the phrase "to
the quantity" for the phrase "to such extent as." But the Congress that
actually enacted § 346 took neither tack. In the absence of such improve-
ments, the wording of § 346 must remain ambiguous.
Id.
108 Id. at 2365.
109 Id. at 2365-66.
110 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
111 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
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ognize this fundamental responsibility.1 12
2. A More Consistent Result
Justice Stevens dissented in Young, adopting an approach con-
sistent with both his Chevron opinion and with pre-Chevron doc-
trine.'13 Stevens argued that the Court misapplied the first level of
the Chevron framework and that the Court should properly reverse
the agency." 14 He found no ambiguity in the statute and thus found
clear congressional intent. He objected to the majority on two
grounds: first, the language of section 346 was not ambiguous on
its face; 15 second, the majority failed to look beyond the statute for
congressional intent. 116 In conclusion Stevens stated that "[t]he
task of interpreting a statute requires more than merely inventing an
ambiguity and invoking administrative deference." 1 7
Stevens noted that the Court easily could construe the statute
against the agency. 118 Indeed, Stevens primarily argued that the
statute had only one proper meaning:
To one versed in the English language, the meaning of this
provision is readily apparent. The plain language of the section
tells us when the Secretary's duty to promulgate regulations
arises--"when such substance ... cannot be so avoided"; it tells
us the purpose of the regulations-to establish a tolerance level
that will enable manufacturers to know what they can lawfully pro-
duce and to enable the public to know what they can safely con-
sume; and it tells us what standard he should employ in drafting
them-"to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of
public health." For purposes of deciding this case, the parties'
agreement that aflatoxins are substances that "cannot be so
avoided" within the meaning of the section triggers the obligation
to initiate rulemaking. 119
According to Stevens, "[t]he Court's contrary conclusion reflect[ed]
112 See Young, 106 S. Ct. at 2364-66.
113 Id. at 2366 (Stevens, J., dissenting). An apt subtitle for this Note might be "Jus-
tice Stevens's Monster." Since writing the majority opinion in Chevron, Justice Stevens
has consistently sided with those members of the Court who reject Chevron as a broad
endorsement of deference. Stevens's dissent in Young is a particularly notable example.
Additionally, his dissenting vote in Chemical Manufacturers perhaps indicates an intention
to examine legislative intent more carefully. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying
text. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct.
1207 (1987), explicitly stated that the Chevron framework requires use of all the "tradi-
tional [interpretive] tools." Id. at 1221; see supra note 75.
114 106 S. Ct. at 2366-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115 Id. at 2367.
116 Id. at2367-68 &n.l.
117 Id. at 2368.
118 Id. at 2367-68.
119 Id. at 2366-67.
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an absence of judgment and of judging."'' 20
Under the Chevron framework, a court must also look beyond
the statute's facial meaning to general legislative intent. 121 The
Young Court only briefly discussed this issue. 122
The Court had significant evidence of legislative intent before it
to aid in its analysis. Before finally approving section 346, Congress
changed its language from "the Secretary is authorized to promul-
gate" to "the Secretary shall promulgate." 123 Additionally, the
House Committee report stated: "The addition of poison to foods
is prohibited except where such addition is necessary or cannot be
avoided; and in such cases tolerances are provided limiting the
amount of added poison to the extent necessary to safeguard public
health." 24
The Court erred analytically in failing to discern congressional
intent. Regardless of the eventual outcome, Chevron and the tradi-
tional review framework obligated the Court to give more than a
120 Id. at 2367.
The Court's finding of ambiguity is simply untenable. The antecedent of
the qualifying language is quite clearly the phrase "limiting the quantity
therein or thereon," which immediately precedes it, rather than the word
"shall," which appears eight words before it. Thus, the Commissioner is
to "limi[t] the quantity [of an added, unavoidable poisonous or deleteri-
ous substance] therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for
the protection of public health." By instead reading the section to mean
that "the Secretary shall promulgate regulations ... to such extent as he
finds necessary," the Court ignores the import of the words immediately
following, which specify the effect of the "limits so fixed'-i.e., fixed by
"limiting the quantity [of the poisonous substance] therein or thereon to
such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public health"-
which can only mean that the qualification modifies the limits set by regu-
lation rather than the duty to regulate. In addition, the Court's construc-
tion, by skipping over the words "limiting the quantity therein or
thereon," renders them superfluous and of no operative force or effect.
Id. (brackets in original).
121 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
122 106 S. Ct. at 2365-66. The Court devoted one paragraph to the issue, primarily
restating the arguments without analysis.
123 HOUSE COMMITrEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 75TH CONG., IST
SEss. 26 (Comm. Print No. 2, 1937), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT AND ITS AMENDMENTS 767, 792 (1979) (emphasis
added).
124 99 H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1938) (emphasis ad-
ded). The Court responded to the change in the language by saying that it was ambigu-
ous, like the statute itself. 106 S. Ct. at 2365-66. Actually, the Court simply labeled this
change ambiguous in comparison to a statement in the legislative history that the Secre-
tary "is authorized to promulgate" tolerance levels. Id. at 2365-66. The Court also held
that Congress's failure to act in response to the agency's long-standing interpretation
provided evidence against the challengers' position. Id. at 2366. The Court previously
rejected this method of statutory interpretation in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 44-46 (1983). Thus, in one paragraph devoid
of analysis, the Court found no evidence of congressional intent in the legislative
history.
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cursory look to the legislative history. 125 The analysis of the legisla-
tive history certainly warranted more than a one-paragraph dismis-
sal, especially when Chevron devoted sixteen pages to such
analysis. 126
3. The Significance of Young
Young raises fundamental questions about the proper role of
courts in reviewing agency decisions of law. The majority's view un-
justifiably expands the deference of Chevron. If Chevron represents
deference, Young represents an almost total abdication of judicial
review.
Young significantly departs from the existing scope-of-review
doctrine for questions of law. Young is based not on the true analyti-
cal framework of Chevron, but rather on Chevron's deferential tone
and language. Scope-of-review doctrine, including Chevron, does
not support the result in Young.' 27 Court deference to the agency in
Young extends far beyond any deference granted in Chevron.128
Some arguments favored the agency's position in Young. That
fact alone, however, does not excuse the Court for abdicating its
interpretational duty. Courts still have primary responsibility to in-
terpret the congressional framework within which an agency must
operate.' 29 As with other interpretational responsibilities, courts
must employ all the reasonable tools available. 130 In Young Justice
Stevens argued that proper use of such tools would have provided a
single answer. More fundamentally, however, the Court should
have undertaken the inquiry. In failing to do so, the Young Court
failed to fulfill "the singularly judicial role of marking the bounda-
ries of agency choice."' 13 1
125 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
126 Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 851-66
(1984).
127 See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
128 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
129 See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
130 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. Generally, courts must look both
to the particular provision and to the statute as a whole in interpreting boundaries.
General principles of statutory construction along with more subtle inquiries into con-
gressional intent should serve as a guide. Justice Marshall in Chemical Man ifacturers in-
terpreted Chevron as mandating a look to the "language, history, structure, and purpose"
of a given provision. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470
U.S. 116, 135 (1985).
131 Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 106 S. Ct. 2360, 2368 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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IV
A BROADER VIEW-ExPLANATIONS FOR
YOUNG'S DEFERENCE
A. Misinterpreted Doctrine
The Young Court may have perceived a need for greater judicial
deference than existing doctrine allowed. The majority fashioned
its own doctrine of greater deference with only nominal reliance on
existing doctrine. The Court abandoned its review function in this
area. Existing doctrine does not support such a move. Additionally,
such a move is poor and perhaps irresponsible jurisprudence. To
implement a broader political agenda at the expense of clear doc-
trine to the contrary is confusing to say the least.
Chevron arguably creates a more deferential judicial mood to-
wards agencies.1 32 This mood, however, does not support defer-
ence in different contexts. The Court found ambiguity in the statute
in Chevron only after a lengthy analysis of legislative intent.133 Chev-
ron does not stand for general judicial deference, but merely exem-
plifies a deferential result reached under the existing framework.
Young was not an appropriate case for Chevron-type deference to the
agency's interpretation because the facts in Young do not parallel the
facts in Chevron. The Clean Air Act amendments in Chevron were
much more ambiguous than section 346 of the FDCA.134 Because
the Chevron Court extensively analyzed the legislative history and
policies behind the statute, its framework does not support greater
judicial deference. Nevertheless, the Young Court supported its de-
cision with Chevron's deferential result. 35
B. A Political Approach
A political perspective may more easily explain the move to-
ward greater deference. Judicial review may constitute an unwar-
ranted intrusion into issues more appropriately addressed by
agencies that are politically responsive to the executive branch and,
to a lesser extent, to the Congress. 136 Agencies often must balance
132 One hesitates to use such an amorphous word as mood. However, some would
argue that mood is the key: "What scope doctrine exists to do is to set or affect judges'
moods in reviewing agency action." W. GELLHORN, supra note 5, at 351. Nevertheless,
to rely solely on mood to the exclusion of doctrine is inappropriate. The doctrine sets
the framework within which this mood operates.
133 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
134 In Chevron, unlike Young, the Court could not resolve the issue based upon either
the language of the provision or clear legislative history.
135 Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 106 S. Ct. 2360, 2364 (1986).
136 Chief Justice Rehnquist's view of the agency/court relationship demonstrates
this view. In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), Rehnquist stated, "Congress has made a choice to at least try
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competing policy questions appropriately addressed by Congress or
the executive branch. Judicial review under this perspective is sim-
ply politically unresponsive interference with this process.
Such an argument misapprehends the nature of the judicial role
in this process. Some bounds always exist to limit an agency's range
of choices.1 37 Congress certainly intends to bind an agency by the
words and purposes of its enabling statute; the judiciary provides
the most effective means of enforcing such congressional restraints
on agency action. 138 Courts allow values to compete in a neutral
setting, apart from the pressures of partisan politics.' 39 The role of
judicial review in this setting is not to control how agencies perform
their function, but rather to enforce congressional limits on exactly
what that function includes. To allow agencies to define the scope of
their own authority is to unleash agency administrators from any ef-
fective control over the limits of their authority and power.1 40 Such
nuclear energy, establishing a reasonable review process in which courts are to play only
a limited role. The fundamental policy questions appropriately resolved in Congress
and in the state legislatures are not subject to re-examination in the federal courts under
the guise of judicial review of agency action. Time may prove wrong the decision to
develop nuclear energy, but it is Congress or the States within their appropriate agen-
cies which must eventually make that judgment." Id. at 557-58 (emphasis in original).
Similarly, in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983), Rehnquist stated, "The agency's changed view of the standard seems to
be related to the election of a new President of a different political party. It is readily
apparent that the responsible members of one administration may consider public
resistance and uncertainties to be more important than do their counterparts in a previ-
ous administration. A change in administration brought about by the people casting
their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the
costs and benefits of its programs and regulations." Id. at 59 (Rehnquist,J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
137 Levin, supra note 30, at 21.
138 See R. PIERCE, supra note 5, § 5.1, at 120-21 ("U]udicial review serves important
purposes linked to the dual goals of assuring that agencies act within constitutional lim-
its and assuring that agency action effectuates policy decisions made by the legisla-
ture."); see also id. § 7.1 at 350 (Thejudiciary's role "is to ensure that agencies act only in
ways that are consistent with the legislative policy decisions reflected in statutes that
delegate power to agencies.").
139 L.JAFFE, supra note 5, at 320 ("The availability ofjudicial review is the necessary
condition, psychologically if not logically, of a system of administrative power which
purports to be legitimate, or legally valid."); see also J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 269-70 (1985) (discussing various ra-
tionales for judicial review).
140 Although responsive to political pressures from Congress and the executive
branch, agencies, and in particular the independent agencies, remain insulated from di-
rect political accountability. See generally Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Ar-
row's Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986
DUKE LJ. 948, 959-63; Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41, 63-67. Judicial
review of the scope of an agency's authority at least provides some measure of control
over agency authority. See generally Gerwin, The Deference Dilemma: Judicial Responses to the
Great Legislative Power Giveaway, 14 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 289 (1987). That control,
however, is limited by problems like agency inaction, see Sunsteen, Reviewing Agency Izac-
tion after Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1985), and agency nonacquiescence.
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a result is contrary to fundamental democratic principles. 14'
Young has implications affecting the balance of power between
the executive and the legislative branches. The judicial role of re-
view has always been narrow, but Young suggests a dangerous
"hands-off" attitude. Courts reviewing agency decisions of law do
not intrude on the executive or legislative function, but prevent the
executive from intruding on the legislative function. In this sense,
the judiciary serves a vital separation-of-powers function. The polit-
ical battles fought in Congress are not to be refought at the adminis-
trative level. Abdicating all responsibility for this type of review
removes a necessary check on executive power.142
CONCLUSION
The Young Court failed to fulfill its basic obligation of statutory
interpretation. A court cannot simply state that the bare language
of the provision is ambiguous and whenever it is ambiguous, the
agency should decide. Questions of law almost invariably involve
ambiguous terms. The proper question, therefore, is: "Who can
properly give meaning to the ambiguous provision?" The Young
analysis automatically requires deference to the agency whenever
the statute "admits of two meanings," rendering a challenge to the
agency interpretation futile.
A court should not defer to the agency unless, using all the in-
terpretational tools available, it cannot discover clear congressional
intent. When the Chevron Court says it will not defer if Congress has
spoken clearly to the precise issue in question, it restates thejudici-
ary's traditional responsibility. The language in Chevron does not
excuse a court from this responsibility. Nor does it allow a court the
discretion to decide when deference is appropriate. A court has the
duty to decide, in the first instance, the congressional intent behind
a statute at issue. Courts must make an effort to find guidance from
all reasonable sources. Deference is only appropriate if, after such
an inquiry, Congress's mandate is still unclear.
Jonathon Bloomberg
See generally Weis, Agency Non-Acquiescence: Respectful Lawlessness or Legitimate Disagreement?,
48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 845 (1987); Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 582 (1985) (authored by William Wade Buzbee).
141 See generally Mayton, supra note 140.
142 Levin, supra note 30, at 18 (judicial review is "certainly a very basic part of our
government's tradition of checks and balances").
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